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Abstract
The literature on informational cascades and herding theory has
for a decade focused on the externality and suboptimal outcomes
generated from decision-making when action spaces are coarser than
private information spaces. Much of the output has therefore been
positive, not normative. This paper redresses this imbalance by detailing
several direct applications for marketing and business arising from
herding theory. We see that business practices such as encouraging early
sales, or selling to groups rather than individual customers, can be
justified theoretically by a direct application of herding theory.
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2 APPLICATIONS OF HERDING THEORY
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  for agent . The signals are informative in the following sense.
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    expected payoff (i.e. his expected payoff before his signal draw).
Finally define #

as the number of signals or actions of type 

drawn or taken up
to and including agent . Now 
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Many of the calculations from Sgroi (2000) are reproduced in the parts 2 and 3 of the appendix.
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Differentiating this requires the use of the digamma and hypergeometric distributions
and produces a fairly complex result. Some comparative statics should provide some
intuition. Table I gives the optimal choice of  for various values of  and  .
Table I: Optimal  Values for the Firm when  = 1 for Given Values of  and 
 0.6 2/3 3/4 4/5
 50 23 19 13 11
100 37 27 17 15
Table II gives the expected number of units sold for various different choices of  by
the firm for a market of size  = 100 for different values of .
Table II: Expected Units Sold for Different Values of  ,  = 100
 9 29 49 69 89
0.51 41 48 51 51 51
 2/3 77 87 83 77 70
4/5 95 94 90 86 82
Table III holds  constant at 23 and varies the size of the market, again looking at the
impact on the expected number of units sold (with percentage of market size in brackets)
of a change in  .
Table III: Expected Units Sold for Different Values of  ,  =
2
3
 9 29 49 69 89
100 77 (77) 87 (87) 83 (83) 77 (77) 70 (70)
 150 117 (78) 135 (90) 132 (88) 126 (84) 120 (80)
250 195 (78) 230 (92) 231 (92) 226 (90) 220 (88)




and we vary  and the ration of  .
	 
   




 9% 25% 49% 75% 91%
100 77% 87% 83% 75% 69%
 150 83% 89% 83% 75% 69%
250 91% 91% 83% 75% 70%
Analyzing tables I to IV reveals a number of interesting comparative statics. Firstly
the impact of raising  on total number of units purchased is non-monotonic. So we do
not expect corner-solutions. Secondly, the impact of  is very dependent on the value
of  and . Thirdly, optimal  is rising in  but falling in . Finally, switching to
percentages reduces the importance of  but does not eliminate it, so the solution cannot
be expressed as a fixed percentage of the market for a given . Some casual observations
would add that a figure of around 25% of the market for  =


whilst not optimal seems
reasonable for an  between 100 and 250, though it is a little high for  approaching
250. So the trade-off gives us a value of  which is nicely in the interior, and not too
high a level for a reasonable value of . As for the impact of  and  we can reason as
follows. As  rises the chance of a  cascade without resort to guinea pigs rises and this
seems sufficient to outweigh the similarly beneficial fall in the number of guinea pigs who
do not purchase from the firm. Therefore, a rising  value indicates that the number of
guinea pigs should be reduced, holding  constant. A rising  value indicates that the
number of guinea pigs should rise, though not as a percentage of  . So the firm should
raise the absolute number but reduce the percentage of the market acting as guinea pigs.
This seems sensible given that market size is decreasingly important for learning in a
herding model, since once a herd has started it will not stop, regardless of the number of
agents remaining in the sequence.
2.2.2.  	
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 Now we consider the case when V = 0, so the firm now has








































































8 APPLICATIONS OF HERDING THEORY
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We will assume in this section that while firms know what the cost of adoption is
for each customer, customers only know their own cost of adoption. There is one very
important benchmark result we can immediately state about the actions of the biased
consumers for a given fixed value of  for all agents in the sequence.
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= (1  )   0 for   1   which also cannot be true.
So if signals are informative, but not too informative then a pessimist will never pur-
chase while an optimist will always purchase. So we have a sensible marketing ploy:
     	
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is a natural extension of  (0 1) where we retain informativeness so force  [ = 05] = 0.
Now consider the coarseness of information for our two types of consumer, a pessimist
and an unbiased consumer.
The unbiased consumer as before gets basic information about the type of signal, either


=  or 


















So our unbiased consumer 	’s information is too coarse to specify a value for


, but can specify which half of the distribution this signal is taken from. In expectation
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and is therefore discrete and strictly positive. Agents
do not directly observe w, instead receiving a signal, µ, at t = 1. We use superscript to
index agents and subscript to index time, so µ
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The endogenous-timing model is very different from the sequential model of section 2.1 so alternative
notation will be used to avoid confusion.
	 
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  such that it is optimal for agent  to invest
at time    if and only if 





 (i). The game will end by   , i.e. if agent  did not invest at time
   he will either invest when    or never invest. (ii). Agent  will only invest at
   if agent  invested at   .
Proof.  	
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 is said to occur when a project has
positive value and one agent invests, but the other agent fails to invest because of problems
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is revealed to all agents.
 	 
  	  
 	





	   

 	 




	 	  
  
   
 


































     		 	 	
 	
    
	  	 
 





	 		       	       	 	




Proposition 6.  τ
∗
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Proposition 7. Complete revelation will only be of any benefit in the fraction of cases
given by:
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 With a cost of gathering information 

  an ex ante (even before
signal values are realized) necessary condition for welfare-improving complete revelation
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(+1) since it is uniform with support [1]. In order for agent  to
fail to invest after observing investment by agent , it must be the case that
1
2
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  When reverse cascades are a serious danger consumers should not be too
quick to attempt to overcome these dangers through further information gathering unless
such extra information can be obtained at very low cost (often in the order of below 1%
of the total potential value of the project). if extra information is costless then it is
unambiguously useful, though even here the implied extra delay diminishes the benefits.
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No cascade by agent 2 will occur with probability 1  Pr [ ()]  Pr [ ()], therefore
Pr [ (2)] =  

. Note of course that this can be alternatively calculated as the oc-







Further note that Pr [ (2)] and Pr [ (2)] are not conditional on  since they are fully
symmetric so Pr [ ()] =


(1 Pr [ ()]). Now note that Pr [ (4)] = Pr [ (2)] +
Pr [ (2)] Pr [ (2)] and similarly for Pr [ (4)]. Further Pr [ (4)] = (Pr [ (2)])

.
Using this we can easily deduce the general probabilities after an even number of 







for no cascade, and Pr [Y (n)] =
Pr [N (n)] =


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Pr [No (2)  V = 1] =


p (1 p) +


p (1 p) = p (1 p)





p (1  p) =


(p 2) (p 1)
After an even number of n agents we have:
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2. Calculation of Expression 2.3:
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. This is the size of the remaining
population of agents,    1, multiplied by the probability of a  cascade being
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Which is simply one minus the combined probability of a  cascade and a  cascade.
Now consider the actions of the decisions made by the post-guinea pig agents. If  agents
make decisions and initiate a  cascade this must involve

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The derivation of the final part of the expression is much as in the case when  = 1
except we now use the probability that a  cascade occurs given  = 0. Note that
the aggregate neutral signal being revealed by the guinea pigs occurs with the same
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 0 and they will have decided
optimally to delay because of a positive option value, and it will remain optimal to delay
  just as in the two agent case. At time  =  + 3 agent  is in an identical
position to the position at time  =  + 2, since no agents have invested once more, so
there is no additional information at all being revealed, and this will clearly be the case
for  =  + 4  + 5  + 6. Therefore there will be no reason for any agent to change
his optimal decision not to invest.
7. Proof of Proposition 6:
There is no option value at time  = 

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+ 1)  0

. Now we move back to period 2 where








+ 1)  0

, or invest to obtain an
expected 

. To roll back the decision to period 1 we now have the expected payoff
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30 APPLICATIONS OF HERDING THEORY
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→∞ the threshold value with complete revelation  does indeed tend to the threshold
signal value without complete revelation  as would be expected and their is no effect on
the threshold value and therefore decision-making from complete revelation If complete
revelation was costly it would therefore reduce firm’s profits. Since from the proof of
proposition 8, we know that the extra delay in investment causes a small but strictly
positive loss in joint payoffs of   0 the necessary and sufficient condition with 
∗
→∞
would involve the need for negative costs to compensate for .
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